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ASSESSING COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN
TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Alexander S. Edmonds*
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the U.S. Supreme
Court developed a framework to assist courts in assessing
individual
disparate
treatment
claims
based
on
circumstantial evidence. Under that test, plaintiffs alleging
discrimination under Title VII must first show a prima facie
case of discrimination. Since McDonnell Douglas, courts have
modified the test by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that
they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated
comparator employee who is outside the plaintiff’s protected
class. Courts disagree, however, on what it means for
employees to be similarly situated. Some courts strictly
interpret the similarly situated requirement; others caution
against an overly mechanical approach and employ a flexible
standard instead. As a result, a plaintiff could successfully
plead a prima facie case of discrimination in one federal
circuit but fail in another. To resolve this disparity, this Note
proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court adopt the Seventh
Circuit’s standard for comparator evidence due to its
consistency with the Court’s precedent, its cohesion with the
purposes underlying Title VII, and its practical benefits for
plaintiffs alleging a prima facie case of employment
discrimination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from
discriminating against their employees or job applicants based on
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”1 Before Title VII was
enacted, many states allowed companies to lawfully discriminate
against employees based on these traits,2 so in the early days of
Title VII litigation, plaintiffs could often use direct evidence to
prove their allegations of discrimination.3 However, as employers
began to eliminate discriminatory policies, direct evidence of
discrimination became less available.4 As a result, plaintiffs began
to rely on circumstantial evidence, or evidence that supports the
inference of discrimination, rather than direct proof of
discrimination.5 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,6 the U.S.
Supreme Court provided a three-part test to assist courts in
evaluating claims of discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence.7 First, the plaintiff must show a prima facie case of

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2018).
See Tamara Lytle, Title VII Changed the Face of the American Workplace, SHRM (May
21, 2014), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/title-vii-changed-theface-of-the-american-workplace.aspx (“[B]efore Title VII, classified ads often spelled out
which genders and races could apply for particular jobs.”).
3 See Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment under Title VII, 87 CALIF L. REV.
983, 997–98 (1999) (“In practice, while cases in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s often involved
either facially discriminatory policies or otherwise ‘smoking gun’ evidence, these types of
direct evidence became more scarce as employers became savvy with respect to Title VII.”).
4 Id. at 985 (“Changes in the nature of discrimination in the workforce since the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 . . . have made direct evidence of intentional
discrimination hard to produce.”).
5 Id. at 1005 (“[M]ost plaintiffs seek to prove disparate treatment discrimination through
circumstantial evidence and inferences.”).
6 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7 Green, supra note 3, at 1014–15 (noting that the McDonnell Douglas test was intended
“to aid parties and courts in litigating these less obvious claims of disparate treatment in
the workplace”). While employment discrimination is this Note’s sole focus, the McDonnell
Douglas test covers nearly every aspect of anti-discrimination law. See Katie Eyer, The
Return of the Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm, 94 WASH. L. REV. 967, 968 (2019)
(stating that “[t]he McDonnell Douglas paradigm is ubiquitous in modern antidiscrimination law,” as lower courts predominantly use the three-part test to evaluate
“housing discrimination, public accommodations discrimination, discrimination in
government programs, and even Equal Protection claims”).
1
2
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discrimination.8 If the plaintiff is successful, the employer must
then provide a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the
adverse employment outcome.9 If the employer does so, then the
plaintiff may respond by showing that the employer’s proffered
reason is pretext for discrimination by the employer.10
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court acknowledged that lower
courts might need to adjust the requirements of a prima facie case
since the facts of each employment discrimination case “will
vary.”11 In response, lower courts have often required plaintiffs to
establish that a “similarly situated” employee outside the
plaintiff’s protected class was “treated more favorably.”12 However,
circuit courts are widely split on what constitutes a “similarly
situated” comparator employee. Standards vary from “nearly
identical”13 to “flexible[ and] common-sense”14 to “similarly
situated in all material respects.”15 Indeed, the standard for
evaluating comparator evidence is perhaps best explained by the
Eleventh Circuit’s recent and eloquent summary: “It’s a mess.”16
In Lewis v. City of Union City, the Eleventh Circuit attempted
“to clean up” the mess by developing a new test for evaluating
comparator evidence presented during the plaintiff’s initial burden
of proof under the McDonnell Douglas test: whether the plaintiff
and the proffered comparators are “similarly situated in all
material respects.”17 In doing so, the court explicitly rejected both

8 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry
the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 804 (stating that employers’ stated rationales cannot be “pretext for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by” Title VII). See infra Part II for a more extensive discussion of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
11 Id. at 802 n.13 (“The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required . . . is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.”).
12 Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000).
13 Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]o
establish disparate treatment a plaintiff must show that the employer ‘gave preferential
treatment to . . . [another] employee under “nearly identical” circumstances’ . . . .” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991))).
14 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Henry v. Jones, 507
F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007)).
15 Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1218.
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its own “nearly identical” standard and the Seventh Circuit’s
standard,18 which finds a comparator sufficient as long as the
distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed comparators
are not “so significant that they render the comparison effectively
useless.”19 The Eleventh Circuit correctly recognized the need for a
clear, uniform standard for comparator evidence; unfortunately, it
chose the wrong one.
In Part II, this Note further discusses the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis of Title VII employment discrimination
claims and the “similarly situated” requirement of a prima facie
case. In Part III, this Note reviews the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuit standards for evaluating comparator evidence at the first
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Finally, in Part IV, this
Note argues that the Seventh Circuit standard is a better
approach to comparator evidence because it is a more practical and
consistent application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding
how courts should treat employment discrimination claims at the
summary judgment stage.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “SIMILARLY SITUATED”
REQUIREMENT
A. INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS AND THE
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM

Congress enacted Title VII to prohibit employers from
discriminating against their employees on the basis of “race, color,
religion, or national origin.”20 The law’s purpose, according to the
U.S. Supreme Court, is “to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over other
employees.”21 Accordingly, under Title VII, it is unlawful for an
employer:

Id.
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS
W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)).
20 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 10 (1963).
21 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (alteration in original)
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971)).
18
19
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.22
Employees can bring a Title VII discrimination claim under two
different theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact.23
These two categories of claims each impose different burdens on
plaintiffs. In disparate impact (or non-intentional discrimination)24
employment claims, plaintiffs must show that a facially neutral
policy adversely affects a statutorily protected group of which the
plaintiff is a member.25 On the other hand, a plaintiff alleging
disparate treatment “must show that the employer engaged in
intentional discrimination.”26 Plaintiffs can prove intentional
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2018).
See Amanda Berg, Note, “An Allemande Worthy of the 16th Century:” A Call to Abolish
the McDonnell Douglas Framework and Adopt Judge Wood's Proposed Flexible Standard,
33 REV. LITIG. 639, 643 (2014) (“Under Title VII, a plaintiff may bring an employment
discrimination claim on the basis of either disparate treatment or disparate impact.”);
Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 833 (2002) (“Employment discrimination claims
fall into two categories—disparate treatment . . . and disparate impact . . . .”).
24 Lidge, supra note 23, at 833 (describing disparate impact claims as “non-intentional
discrimination” claims because “[t]he plaintiff does not have to prove that the employer
intended to discriminate”).
25 Berg, supra note 23, at 643 (“A claim of discrimination based on disparate impact is
established when a plaintiff establishes that facially neutral policies or practices
disproportionately affect the members of the plaintiffs statutorily protected group.”).
26 Lidge, supra note 23, at 834. Many Title VII employment discrimination cases involve
disparate treatment. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . . Undoubtedly disparate treatment
was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.”).
22
23
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discrimination “by producing direct evidence or circumstantial
(indirect) evidence.”27 However, employment discrimination
plaintiffs rarely can show intentional discrimination with direct
evidence;28 thus, the majority of plaintiffs rely on circumstantial
evidence to prove intent.29
Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,30 developed a three-part
burden-shifting analysis that plaintiffs could use to bring
employment discrimination claims without direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.31 The first part of the analysis requires that
plaintiffs plead a prima facie case of racial discrimination
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant’s qualifications.32
If the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to produce a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
Lidge, supra note 23, at 835.
Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[E]mployment
discrimination plaintiffs . . . rarely are fortunate enough to have access to direct evidence of
intentional discrimination.”); see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 716 (1983) (“There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental
processes.”).
29 Lidge, supra note 23, at 835 (noting that the lack of direct evidence of intentional
discrimination leads plaintiffs to “use circumstantial evidence to establish the employer’s
discriminatory intent”).
30 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff was laid off and was later
denied reemployment after participating in a protest against alleged racial discrimination
by McDonnell Douglas Corporation. Id. at 794–96. Plaintiff claimed that McDonnell
Douglas violated the Civil Rights Act by “refus[ing] to rehire him because of his race and
persistent involvement in the civil rights movement.” Id. at 796. The district court
dismissed plaintiff’s claim, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed, allowing the plaintiff to bring his claim of discrimination. Id. at 797–98, 807.
31 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“The shifting
burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‘plaintiff
[has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979))).
32 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
27
28
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reason for the employee’s rejection.”33 If the employer can
articulate such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “to
demonstrate that [the employer’s] assigned reason for refusing to
re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application.”34
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATOR EVIDENCE

While McDonnell Douglas contains language specific to claims
of racial discrimination in the rejection of a job application,35 the
Court acknowledged that “facts necessarily will vary in Title VII”
discrimination cases and that the prima facie requirements could
be altered based on different situations.36 This Note focuses on the
test courts have used for cases involving alleged discrimination
based on discharge.37 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower
courts have used comparators to evaluate claims of discrimination
arising from discharge; this involves using evidence that a plaintiff
was treated differently from a similarly situated employee outside
the plaintiff’s claimed protected group to infer a prima facie case of
discrimination.38 For many courts, comparator evidence has

Id.
Id. at 807.
35 Id. at 802 (articulating the burden-shifting test in the context of a claim concerning an
“employee’s rejection”).
36 Id. at 802 n.13 (“[T]he specification . . . of the prima facie proof required . . . is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”).
37 These are the most common employment discrimination claims under Title VII. See
J.
(Feb.
4,
2015)
Top
10
Employment
Discrimination
Claims,
INS.
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/02/04/356405.htm
(“Discharge
continues to be the most common issue for all bases under Title VII . . . .”).
38 See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006) (per curiam) (“[Comparator]
evidence may suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext.”); O’Connor v. Consol.
Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (noting that “the fact that a replacement
[employee] is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age
discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class”); Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“[P]laintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing . . . that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’ employees outside her class more
favorably.”); Morris v. Town of Indep., 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n employee
must demonstrate that she ‘. . . was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
employees outside the protected group.’” (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320
(5th Cir. 2014))); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff must
offer evidence that: ‘. . . another similarly situated individual who was not in the protected
33
34
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become a threshold requirement for discrimination claims and is
fundamental to the definition of discrimination.39

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE STANDARD FOR COMPARATOR
EVIDENCE
Courts are split on just how similarly situated a comparator
must be to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Because
comparator evidence has become crucial to proving a
discrimination claim in many circuits, how a court defines a
“comparator” and how similar it requires that comparator to be
can control the outcome of a plaintiff’s case. The differences
between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ standards for
comparator evidence illuminate the pressing need for review by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S “NOT USELESS” STANDARD

In Coleman v. Donahoe,40 Denise Coleman, a black mailprocessing clerk was fired from her job at the United States Postal
Service (USPS) for expressing homicidal thoughts about her
supervisor, William Berry, to a psychiatrist.41 In 2005, Coleman
sought psychiatric help for depression, anxiety, and insomnia.42

class was treated more favorably than the plaintiff.’” (quoting Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of
Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2006))).
39 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] finding of discrimination requires a comparison of otherwise similarly
situated persons who are in different groups by reason of certain characteristics provided by
statute.”). Some commentators warn that the pervasive requirement of comparator evidence
in discrimination claims is an overly simplistic and insufficient method for evaluating
discrimination claims, while others find comparator evidence itself to be an effective and
appropriate metric for discrimination claims. Compare Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 751, 772 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he
judicial demand for comparators functions largely as a barrier to discrimination claims” and
that courts should reconsider the use of comparators in their current form), with Charles A.
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 191, 197 (2009) (arguing that a more logical approach to discrimination claims is to
allow juries to make an inference of discrimination if the plaintiff identifies a similarly
situated comparator).
40 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012).
41 Id. at 840–41.
42 Id. at 843.
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While undergoing treatment, Coleman displayed extreme paranoia
about harassment by her supervisor and raised homicidal
thoughts about Berry.43 Coleman was discharged less than a
month later, and her psychiatrist described her “as a ‘model
patient’ in ‘stable’ condition.”44 When Coleman was discharged,
however, her psychiatrist informed Berry about Coleman’s threats
to his life.45 Berry and two other managers immediately decided to
put Coleman on “‘emergency off-duty status’ without pay” and
started termination procedures.46 After an internal investigation
by USPS, Coleman was fired for “unacceptable conduct[] as
evidenced by [her] expressed homicidal ideations toward a postal
manager.”47 After Coleman was reinstated two years later
following arbitration with USPS, she “filed . . . suit alleging that
the Postal Service had discriminated against her on the basis of
race, sex, and disability by placing her on off-duty status and
terminating her.”48
The district court granted USPS’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that “Coleman had failed to establish a prima
facie case under the McDonnell Douglas ‘indirect’ method of proof
because she had not identified any similarly situated employees
outside of her protected classes who were treated more
favorably.”49 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Coleman claimed
that she had proffered two comparators who were similarly
situated—Frank Arient and Robert Pelletier—“two white male
employees . . . [who had] ‘held a knife to the throat of a black male
co-worker’ ‘while holding down his legs.’”50 These employees’
supervisors investigated the incident, concluded that the event
was merely “horseplay,” and suspended the two men for fourteen
days without pay.51 The district court concluded that while the
incidents were somewhat similar, Arient and Pelletier were not
Id.
Id.
45 Id. (noting that Coleman’s psychiatrist clarified to Mr. Berry that she would not discuss
Coleman but did “consider[] [it] to be [her] responsibility . . . as the patient’s physician to
warn him that [her] patient had been expressing threats to his life”).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 844.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 844–45.
50 Id. at 847.
51 Id.
43
44
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sufficient comparators because they both had different jobs and
answered to a different supervisor than Coleman.52
The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the
comparators were “similar enough to permit a reasonable
inference of discrimination.”53 The court held that the similarly
situated question is a “flexible, common-sense” one;54 while the
employees need to be similar and comparable “in all material
respects,” comparators do not need to be “identical in every
conceivable way.”55 Thus, the court stated, “So long as the
distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed comparators
are not ‘so significant that they render the comparison effectively
useless,’ the similarly-situated requirement is satisfied.”56
The court recognized that the similarly situated standard
should not be a “mechanical” or “magic formula.”57 Accordingly, the
court held that a plaintiff must at least show that the comparators
“(1) ‘dealt with the same supervisor,’ (2) ‘were subject to the same
standards,’ and (3) ‘engaged in similar conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.’”58
Applying this standard, the court found that Coleman’s
comparators were sufficiently similarly situated.59 While Coleman
and her comparators did not share a direct supervisor, they did
share “a common decision-maker.”60 The court found it immaterial
that Coleman and her comparators had different job titles; rather,
the relevant question was whether they were subject to different
employment policies, which was not the case.61 Lastly, the court
held that a jury could conclude that the comparators’ conduct of
holding a knife to another employee’s throat was just as serious as,

Id.
Id. at 852.
54 Id. at 846 (quoting Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007)).
55 Id. (quoting Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2009)).
56 Id. (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)).
57 Id. at 847 (quoting Humphries, 474 F.3d at 405).
58 Id. (quoting Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008)).
59 Id. at 852 (“Coleman’s proposed comparators . . . are similar enough to permit a
reasonable inference of discrimination, and that is all McDonnell Douglas requires.”).
60 Id. at 848.
61 See id. at 849 (“Their different titles and duties do not defeat, as a matter of law, the
probative value of their different disciplinary treatment.”).
52
53
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if not more than, Coleman’s indirect threat to Berry.62 Because
Coleman’s proposed comparators dealt with the same supervisor,
were subject to the same employment policies, and engaged in
similar threatening conduct, they were “similar enough to permit a
reasonable inference of discrimination, and that is all McDonnell
Douglas requires.”63
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S “MATERIAL RESPECTS” STANDARD

The Eleventh Circuit took Lewis v. City of Union City en banc
“to clarify once and for all the proper standard for comparator
evidence in intentional-discrimination cases.”64 After explicitly
rejecting the standard articulated in Donahoe, the Eleventh
Circuit set forth its “similarly situated in all material respects”
standard for assessing comparator evidence.65 Jacqueline Lewis
was a black female detective with the Union City Police
Department.66 In 2009, “[s]he suffered a heart attack . . . but was
cleared to return to work without any restrictions.”67 The next
year, however, the police department adopted a new policy
requiring all officers to carry tasers; and “[a]s part of the training
associated with the new policy, officers had to receive a five-second
Taser shock.”68 Lewis’s doctor recommended that Lewis, because of
her heart attack, be exempted from the taser shock and that
pepper spray should not be used “on or near” her.69 Consequently,
then-Police Chief Charles Odom “concluded that the restrictions
described by Lewis’s doctor prevented her from performing the
essential duties of her job,” and he placed Lewis on unpaid
administrative leave “until such time [as her doctor] release[d]

62 Id. at 851 (“By directly threatening another employee with a knife in the workplace,
Arient and Pelletier engaged in conduct that appears, at least for purposes of summary
judgment, at least as serious as Coleman’s indirect ‘threat’ against Berry . . . .”). The court
ultimately reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to USPS and “remanded
for further proceedings.” Id. at 862.
63 Id. at 852.
64 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019).
65 Id. at 1224.
66 Id. at 1218.
67 Id.
68 Id. Lewis, along with other officers, also had to complete a “separate pepper-spray
training.” Id. at 1219.
69 Id.
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[her] to return to full and active duty.”70 Lewis was directed to
complete paperwork about her absence and to use her accrued paid
leave.71 When the paid leave ran out, Lewis had not completed the
necessary paperwork and was terminated pursuant to a personnel
policy stating that “[a]ny unapproved leave of absence [is] cause
for dismissal.”72
Lewis alleged race and gender discrimination in violation of
Title VII in an action against Union City.73 She identified two
white police officers as comparators who, she alleged, were treated
more favorably: Cliff McClure, a white male sergeant who failed
part of the officer physical-fitness test but was given ninety days of
unpaid leave to pass; and Walker Heard, a white male officer who
also partially failed the physical-fitness test but “was also placed
on unpaid administrative leave for [ninety] days” and was later
offered a position as a dispatcher.74 The district court granted the
City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the two
comparators failed to satisfy the “nearly identical” or “same or
similar” standard.75
The Eleventh Circuit, recognizing its inconsistent caselaw on
whether comparators had to be “nearly identical” to or the “same
or similar” as the plaintiff, “took [the] case en banc to clarify the
proper standard for comparator evidence in intentionaldiscrimination cases.”76 Lewis urged the court to adopt the
Seventh Circuit’s standard, which requires plaintiffs to show that
their differences with the comparators are not “so significant that
they render the comparison effectively useless.”77 On the other

Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
72 Id. (alterations in original).
73 Id. Lewis also brought claims under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. The district court stated that “Eleventh Circuit caselaw provides that a plaintiff
seeking to establish a prima facie case of discrimination must show that she and the
comparator are ‘nearly identical’” and that “[a] reasonable jury could not . . . conclude that
Plaintiff is ‘similarly situated in all relevant respects.’” Lewis v. City of Union City, No.
1:12-CV-4038-RWS-JFK, 2014 WL 12796415, at *16–17 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2014) (first
quoting Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); and then
quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998)).
76 Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220.
77 Id. at 1224 (quoting Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012)).
70
71
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hand, the City argued that the court should retain its “nearlyidentical standard.”78
The en banc court “conclude[d] that neither party’s proposal
quite fit[] the bill.”79 Instead, the court held that a plaintiff “must
show that she and her comparators are ‘similarly situated in all
material respects.’”80 According to the court, this standard most
fairly executes federal protections against discrimination, balances
employee needs with deference to employer discretion, and
encourages judicial efficiency through sensible application of
summary judgment.81 While acknowledging that the precision of
the material respects standard “will have to be worked out on a
case-by-case basis, in the context of individual circumstances,”82
the court identified some similarities that typically will trigger a
valid comparison:
Ordinarily, for instance, a similarly situated
comparator—
• will have engaged in the same basic conduct (or
misconduct) as the plaintiff;
• will have been subject to the same employment
policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff;
• will ordinarily (although not invariably) have been
under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the
plaintiff; and
• will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary
history.83
Applying its new standard, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Lewis’s proffered comparators were not similarly situated in all
material respects.84 The court reasoned that Lewis and her
comparators “were placed on leave years apart and pursuant to
altogether different personnel policies and . . . for altogether

Id.
Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1224–25.
82 Id. at 1227.
83 Id. at 1227–28 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
84 Id. at 1230 (noting that Lewis’s “broad-brush summary” of her and her comparators’
situations “glosse[d] over critical differences”).
78
79
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different conditions.”85 For example, while the two comparator
officers were placed on leave pursuant to a department physical
fitness examination policy, Lewis was instead placed on leave
under the department’s personnel policy.86 Moreover, the court
noted that the comparator officers’ physical fitness failures were
far different from Lewis’s heart condition; while the officers’
balance and agility problems “were at least theoretically . . .
remediable,” Lewis suffered from a heart condition that was
permanent and, therefore, might never have been able to take part
in the required training.87 Because Lewis’s proposed comparators
were put on leave for different circumstances and were not subject
to the same personnel policies, the court found that they were not
similar “in all material respects” and thus were not sufficient
comparators for a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.88
C. DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS OF “MATERIAL RESPECTS”

At first blush, it may seem that the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits’ standards are similar. Both courts mention “material
respects” and list similar factors for considering comparator
evidence, such as being subject to the same employment
standards, reporting to the same supervisor, and engaging in
similar misconduct.89 However, the policies underlying each court’s
reasoning are considerably different. For example, the Seventh
Circuit held that the purpose of the similarly situated prong is “to
eliminate other possible explanatory variables” so that the court
can isolate whether the employer had discriminatory animus.90
Accordingly, a comparator is sufficiently similar as long as the
differences between the plaintiff and comparator are not
substantial enough to make the comparison pointless.91 The court
Id.
Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1231.
89 Compare Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Similarly situated
employees ‘must be “directly comparable” to the plaintiff “in all material respects”’ . . . .”
(quoting Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2009))), with
Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1224 (“[A] plaintiff must show that she and her comparators are
‘similarly situated in all material respects’”).
90 Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846.
91 Id. (citing Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)).
85
86
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argued that “[t]his flexible standard” is more consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court’s view of Title VII,92 since the Court neither
planned to impose a burdensome standard on plaintiffs alleging
discrimination93 nor intended to impose “rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic” requirements for a prima facie case of alleged
discrimination.94 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
question of whether a comparator is sufficiently similar should be
reserved for the fact-finder and that summary judgment is only
permissible when “no reasonable fact-finder could find that
plaintiffs have met their burden on the issue.”95
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held that its “material
respects” standard more closely adheres to the ordinary meaning
of discrimination: “the act of ‘treating like cases differently.’”96
Moreover, the court held that its standard realistically reflects the
two aims that the U.S. Supreme Court intended to achieve with
the prima facie case requirement: “(1) to eliminate ‘the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons’ for an employer’s conduct, and
(2) to provide a sound basis for an ‘inference of unlawful
discrimination.’”97 The court added that its standard “leaves
employers the necessary breathing space to make appropriate
business judgments.”98 Finally, the court reasoned that its
standard promotes judicial efficiency by only granting summary
judgment “in appropriate cases—namely, where the comparators
are simply too dissimilar to permit a valid inference that invidious
discrimination is afoot.”99

See, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846 (“To offer a prima facie case of discrimination under the
[McDonnell Douglas] indirect method, the plaintiff’s burden is ‘not onerous.’” (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))).
94 Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
95 Id. at 846–47 (quoting Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945 (7th Cir. 2009)).
96 Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1225 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting NLRB v.
Collier, 553 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1977)). When “adopting a comparator standard,” the
court expressed its intent to avoid “stray[ing] too far from paradigmatic notions of
discrimination, lest [the court] sanction a regime in which treating different things
differently violates Title VII, which clearly it does not.” Id.
97 Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253–54).
98 Id. at 1228. The court noted that employers may “accord different treatment to
employees who are differently situated in ‘material respects’—e.g., who engaged in different
conduct, who were subject to different policies, or who have different work histories.” Id.
99 Id. at 1229.
92
93
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These differences are more than mere semantics. While the two
circuits may both use the word “material” and investigate the
same facts, they fundamentally disagree on the role that
comparator evidence plays in a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. For example, imagine two identical plaintiffs, who
both worked in sales for the same large company, bring a charge of
employment discrimination in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.
Both plaintiffs are women who belong to a protected minority
class, and both were allegedly fired due to insufficient
performance. However, the plaintiffs claim that they were fired
based on intentional discrimination from their employer. To prove
their prima facie cases, they each point to a white, male coworker
who works for the same employer. Each comparator had similar
performance reviews and sales records, and each comparator was
subject to the same personnel policies as the plaintiffs. However,
the plaintiffs and their respective comparators worked in different
roles within different sales groups at the company, and they each
answered to a different supervisor.
In this hypothetical, both the Seventh and the Eleventh
Circuits would ask whether the comparator was materially similar
to the plaintiff, and both would evaluate the same facts. However,
the Seventh Circuit’s “not-useless” standard100 asks whether the
differences are so substantial that it makes the comparison
pointless.101 Accordingly, the court could find that while the two
employees were subject to different supervisors, the fact that they
had identical roles and performance reviews is enough to conclude
that the two were “similar enough to permit a reasonable inference
of discrimination.”102 However, the Eleventh Circuit’s “material
respects” standard asks whether the plaintiff and comparator are
“similarly situated in all material respects” and prioritizes not
only employee protection but also the employer’s “rational
business judgments” as well as judicial efficiency.103 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit is more likely to find that, since the plaintiff and
comparator worked in different roles under different supervisors,
Id. at 1224 (describing the plaintiff’s preferred Seventh Circuit standard as the “notuseless standard”).
101 See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846.
102 Id. at 852.
103 Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis
added).
100
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they are not sufficiently similar to make a prima facie case.104
Thus, the standards are quite different and in practice can have
significant consequences for plaintiffs depending on where a
discrimination claim is filed.

IV. THE CASE FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S STANDARD FOR
COMPARATOR EVIDENCE
While both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits address
comparator evidence using a material respects standard, the
courts differ in how they apply that standard, and they disagree on
the policies underlying the requirement of comparator evidence at
the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. As
illustrated by the above hypothetical, plaintiffs claiming
employment discrimination in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
will be subject to far different standards depending on which court
hears their case. To remedy this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court
should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s standard for comparator
evidence. It is more consistent with the Court’s precedent, and the
burden it imposes on plaintiffs in these cases is more logical, given
that plaintiffs are required to show only a prima facie case of
discrimination.
A. CONSISTENCY WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

The Seventh Circuit’s not-useless standard is more consistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the similarly situated
requirement and with the policy concerns underlying it. This
consistency is evident from the Court’s holding in Young v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.105 In that case, Young, a UPS driver, became
pregnant and was unable to lift more than twenty pounds, which
violated a UPS policy requiring employees to be able to lift up to
seventy pounds.106 Young was told that she could not work until

104 For a more detailed discussion of how the Eleventh Circuit applied its standard in
Lewis, see supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
105 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
106 Id. at 211. Young involved the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which forbids disparate
treatment of pregnant workers that are similar to nonpregnant workers “in their ability or
inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018); see also Young, 575 U.S. at 210
(summarizing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act). However, the Court applied the
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she was able to lift the required weight.107 Young sued UPS,
alleging discrimination on the basis of her pregnancy.108 She
proffered several comparators in her allegation, including nonpregnant employees who could not drive because they lacked the
qualifications, non-pregnant employees whose disabilities
rendered them physically unfit to drive, and non-pregnant
employees who could not lift seventy pounds at all.109 The Court
held that “there [was] a genuine dispute as to whether UPS
provided more favorable treatment to . . . some employees whose
situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from Young’s,” and
remanded the case to the district court to conduct the pretext
inquiry under McDonnell Douglas.110 Therefore, the Court found
that Young and her alleged comparators were at least similar
enough to proceed past the “similarly situated” inquiry of the
prima facie stage.111
If one were to plug these same facts into the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits’ standards for similarly situated employees,
Young’s claim likely would only survive in the Seventh Circuit. In
Lewis, Lewis and her comparators were all placed on
administrative leave “because they were not fit for duty[,] and . . .
they could not return to duty until they were fit to do so.”112 Yet
the Eleventh Circuit found that Lewis was not similar to her
comparators in all material respects because they were placed on
leave for different reasons and were subject to different policies.113
McDonnell Douglas analysis in the same manner as in Title VII cases. See Young, 575 U.S.
at 212–13.
107 Young, 575 U.S. at 211 (“UPS told Young she could not work while under a lifting
restriction.”).
108 Id. (describing Young’s “claim that UPS acted unlawfully in refusing to accommodate
her pregnancy-related lifting restriction”).
109 Id. at 215–17 (stating the conditions under which UPS would accommodate its
workers with replacement “inside” jobs).
110 Id. at 231.
111 Id. at 230 (stating that Young could satisfy the prima facie showing under McDonnell
Douglas because, “if the facts are as [she] says they are, [then] she can show that UPS
accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically
failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations”).
112 Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (Rosenbaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 Id. at 1230 (majority opinion) (“Lewis and her comparators were placed on leave years
apart and pursuant to altogether different personnel policies and, perhaps even more
importantly, for altogether different conditions.”).
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Under the Eleventh Circuit’s material respects standard, Young
likely would not be sufficiently similarly situated to her
comparators to pass the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas.
In Young, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Young was
sufficiently similarly situated to her alleged comparators for the
prima facie stage even though they were placed on leave for
different reasons.114 However, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Lewis’s inability to receive a taser shock and participate in pepper
spray training and her comparators’ inability to pass a physical
fitness test were “simply too dissimilar to permit a valid inference
that invidious discrimination [was] afoot.”115
If Lewis and her comparators—who worked in similar roles and
who were all placed on leave for being physically unfit for duty
under the same supervisor—were not similarly situated in all
material respects,116 then Young and her comparators—some of
whom were placed on leave for completely different reasons than
Young117—likely could not be “similarly situated in all material
respects” under the Eleventh Circuit’s standard.118 Thus, in the
Eleventh Circuit, Young’s claim would likely not have passed the
prima facie phase of McDonnell Douglas, demonstrating that the
Eleventh Circuit’s material respects standards may be a
significant departure from the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to
comparator evidence.
The Seventh Circuit’s standard, however, is consistent with
Young. In Coleman, the Seventh Circuit stated that its “flexible
standard” precludes the imposition of an onerous burden on
plaintiffs during the prima facie stage of an employment
discrimination claim.119 Instead, the court held that “summary
judgment is appropriate only when ‘no reasonable fact-finder could
114 See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. These comparators were given
accommodations for noticeably different reasons than an inability to lift seventy pounds due
to pregnancy, such as on- and off-the-job injuries, permanent disabilities, lost driver’s
licenses, lost Department of Transportation certificates, and failed medical exams. See
Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1247, 1257 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Young, 575 U.S. at 214–218).
115 Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1229 (majority opinion).
116 See id. at 1256 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118 Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218.
119 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
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find that plaintiffs have met their burden,’” requiring only that
“the distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed
comparators are not ‘so significant that they render the
comparison effectively useless.’”120 This standard, in contrast to
the Eleventh Circuit’s, is far more consistent with Young. Young’s
comparators received accommodations for considerably different
circumstances and under different policies.121 Even so, the Court
found them sufficiently similar to move past the prima facie stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis since “there [was] a genuine
dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to
at least some employees whose situation [could not] reasonably be
distinguished from Young’s.”122 This analysis better reflects the
Seventh Circuit’s “flexible, common-sense” standard for
comparator evidence at the prima facie stage than the Eleventh
Circuit’s standard.123 Therefore, if given the opportunity, the U.S.
Supreme Court should affirm the Seventh Circuit’s approach as
the appropriate standard for evaluating comparator evidence at
the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
B. PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S STANDARD

Apart from its consistency with U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the Seventh Circuit’s standard is a reasonable and practical
approach to evaluating comparator evidence at the prima facie
stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. However, the Eleventh
Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit’s standard as “too lax.”124 It
argued that the Seventh Circuit “departs too dramatically from the
essential sameness that is necessary to a preliminary
determination that the plaintiff’s employer has engaged in
unlawful ‘discrimination’” and “risks giving courts too much
leeway to upset employers’ valid business judgments.”125
Nonetheless, there are several policy reasons why the Court

120 Id. at 846–47 (first quoting Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945 (7th Cir. 2009);
then quoting Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007)).
121 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
122 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 231 (2015).
123 Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841.
124 Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2019).
125 Id. at 1225.
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should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach for assessing
comparator evidence in discrimination cases.
1. Imposing Practical Burdens on Plaintiff-Employees. The
Seventh Circuit standard is a far more practical burden to place on
plaintiffs at the prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. The question of whether a comparator is similarly
situated is usually reserved for the fact-finder; accordingly,
summary judgment should only be granted when “no reasonable
fact-finder could find that plaintiffs have met their burden on the
issue.”126 Thus, at the prima facie stage, the standard for similarly
situated comparators should be flexible, and comparators should
only be found insufficient if, as the Seventh Circuit held, the
differences between the comparator and the plaintiff are so evident
that any comparison would be meaningless.127
2. Reserving Discretion for Employers’ Business Decisions. The
Seventh Circuit’s standard does not afford courts too much leeway
to upset employers’ business decisions because the prima facie
stage is only the first part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. If a
plaintiff adequately shoulders the burden of a prima facie showing
of discrimination, then the case does not immediately go to trial;
rather, the employer is given a chance to produce a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the employment action.128 Thus,
even if an employer fails to show that the proffered comparators
are not similarly situated, it still has the opportunity to explain
why it was engaging in a “valid” business decision rather than
discrimination.129 To be sure, reducing the required amount of
similarity between comparators likely will result in a higher
volume of discrimination claims that succeed at the prima facie
stage.130 Nevertheless, the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis affords the employer the opportunity to explain the

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846–47 (quoting Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945 (7th Cir.
2009)).
127 See id. at 848 (“Comparators need only be similar enough to enable ‘a meaningful
comparison.’” (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007))).
128 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
129 Contra Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1225–26.
130 Cf. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1242 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that the Eleventh Circuit standard “ensures that at least some plaintiffs with
potentially valid claims of discrimination will never get the opportunity to show that the
employer’s offered reason is a cover for discrimination”).
126
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apparent discrimination.131 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s standard
does not risk giving courts too much leeway to interfere with
business decisions because it preserves an opportunity for
employers to justify their actions.132 Rather, the standard simply
increases the likelihood that an employer will have to give a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged disparate
treatment of the plaintiff.133
3. Allowing for Flexible Review of Dissimilar Fact Patterns. The
Eleventh Circuit argues that the Seventh Circuit’s standard strays
from the “essential sameness” that is required for an initial
determination of unlawful discrimination.134 While a comparator
may be similar enough that a comparison would not be “irrelevant
or crazy,” the court argued that comparators must provide “a
sound basis for an ‘inference of unlawful discrimination.’”135
But the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected arguments for a
“rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” application of the McDonnell
Douglas test136 and has cautioned against requiring “precise
equivalence” between comparators.137 Rather, the similarly
situated inquiry simply requires a showing that the proffered
employees are “comparable.”138 A standard that emphasizes
131 See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981) (detailing the
employer’s burden under the second step of McDonnell Douglas).
132 See Benjamin D. McAninch, Commentary, Removing the Thumb from the Scale: The
Eleventh Circuit Summary Judgment Standard for Disparate Treatment Cases in the Wake
of Chapman v. A1 Transport, 53 ALA. L. REV. 949, 954 (2002) (“The [U.S. Supreme] Court
recognized that Title VII was not designed to limit traditional management techniques, and
that this goal is furthered by a scheme whereby defendants only bear the burden of a clear
and specific explanation of their nondiscriminatory motives.”).
133 It is worth emphasizing that even if the Seventh Circuit standard causes a greater
number of business decisions to be scrutinized for invidious discrimination, such a result is
appropriate under Title VII. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1243 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[C]ontrary to what McDonnell Douglas and its progeny
anticipated, by focusing on the employer’s interests, the Majority Opinion naturally winds
up with a system decidedly weighted towards the employer instead of delicately balanced
between the interests of both parties.”).
134 Id. at 1225 (majority opinion).
135 Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981)).
136 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“The method suggested
in McDonnell Douglas . . . was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather,
it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience
as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.”).
137 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976).
138 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
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flexibility and only rejects comparators at the prima facie stage
when they are so different such that any comparison would be
useless is far more consistent with the Court’s language on
comparator evidence than one that requires “essential sameness”
at the prima facie stage.139

V. CONCLUSION
Between 2010 and 2017, more than one million American
workers have claimed that their employers violated federal law
because of employment discrimination.140 As the use of comparator
evidence has become a key component of employment
discrimination law, which standard a court uses when assessing
comparator evidence has tremendous implications for the potential
success of hundreds of thousands of discrimination claims. Since
circuits are divided on the standards for comparator evidence, the
success of many discrimination claims will likely hinge on the
jurisdiction in which they are filed. The Seventh Circuit’s standard
is the most logical approach to assessing comparator evidence
because of its alignment with the policies underlying the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, its consistency with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, and its practicality at the prima facie stage of
McDonnell Douglas. Therefore, the Court should clarify the proper
standard for similarly situated comparators by adopting the
Seventh Circuit’s not-useless standard for comparators in
employment discrimination cases.

139 Compare Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1225 (stating that the Seventh Circuit’s standard “departs
too dramatically from the essential sameness that is necessary to a preliminary
determination that the plaintiff’s employer has engaged in unlawful ‘discrimination’”), with
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (“So long as the distinctions between
the plaintiff and the proposed comparators are not ‘so significant that they render the
comparison effectively useless,’ the similarly-situated requirement is satisfied.” (quoting
Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007))).
140 See Maryam Jameel, Leslie Shapiro & Joe Yerardi, More than 1 Million Employment
Discrimination Complaints Have Been Filed with the Government Since 2010, WASH. POST
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/business/discriminationcomplaint-outcomes/ (providing a breakdown—including of relief sought and obtained and
of the type of discrimination alleged—of cases filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission between 2010 and 2017).
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